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There is already a large literature on the causes and effects of mass
incarceration'-or hyper-incarceration as Loic Wacquant more accurately labels
the phenomenon.2 Much less has been written about exit strategies,3 and, so, I
want to devote this paper to exploring the available options.
In doing so, however, I start by holding open the possibility that there are no
such options. Leibnitzian optimism has a dark side: If successful exit strategies
were possible, they would surely have been discovered already. As the old
economist joke has it, if that piece of paper lying on the ground were really a $100
bill, someone would have picked it up by now.
Beyond this general point is the dispiriting reality that the tragedy of hyper-
incarceration is tied to very large political and economic trends that are unlikely to
be reversed. As others have convincingly demonstrated, the proximate cause of
the astonishing growth of imprisonment seems to be the collapse of the black
ghetto and, with it, of more subtle forms of discipline that once kept a racially
defined "underclass" under control.4 That collapse, in turn, relates to very
. Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
I am grateful to M. Gregg Bloche, David Cole, Heidi Li Feldman, James Forman, Allegra McLeod,
Gary Peller, Daria Roithmayr, Russell Stevenson, Frederick Weisberg, and Kathryn Zeiler for
comments on an earlier draft of this article. Kellyn Goler and Samantha Godwin provided
outstanding research assistance.
For an introduction to the literature, see, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW
(2010); MARIE GOTrSCHALK, THE PRISON AND THE GALLOWS: THE POLITICS OF MASS INCARCERATION
IN AMERICA (2006); MASS IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (David Garland ed.,
2001); BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2006).
2 Wacquant argues that the "hyper-incarceration" more accurately describes the phenomenon
because the risk of imprisonment is heavily weighted toward a particular sub-community. See Loic
Wacquant, Deadly Symbiosis: When Ghetto and Prison Meet and Mesh, in MASS IMPRISONMENT:
SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 82, 82 (David Garland ed., 2001).
For some proposals, see GOTrSCHALK, supra note 1, at 238-39 (proposing "infusing the
U.S. penal system with an ethos of respect and dignity for its millions of prisoners, parolees,
probationers, and former prisoners that is sorely lacking"); MICHAEL JACOBSON, DOWNSIZING
PRISONS: How To REDUCE CRIME AND END MASS INCARCERATION 216-17 (2005) (proposing state-
based reform).
4 For a short description of the splintering of the African American ghetto, the development
and concentration of the African American "underclass," and the accompanying breakdown of earlier
methods of social control, see William Julius Wilson, Cycles of Deprivation and the Underclass
Debate, 59 Soc. SERV. REV. 541 (1985). For Wilson's full-blown and classic study, see WILLIAM
JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC
POLICY (1987) [hereinafter THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED]. Loic Wacquant has provided the most
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persistent racism, the splintering of the African-American community, the
selective unemployment effects of world trade and globalization, and, most
broadly, the decline of the U.S. economic and political power that supported
American prosperity for generations.' Devising a strategy to reverse all of that
would be quite an undertaking.
There is little reason, then, to be very hopeful about the possibilities of
change. In this paper, I nonetheless want to explore the potential for approaches
that ignore underlying causes and address instead the micro-processes that support
hyper-incarceration. I do so, in large part, because of my belief that human dignity
requires resistance to overwhelming evil, even in cases where the evil is quite
unlikely to be overcome. Perhaps paradoxically, in some cases the response may
even require trafficking in the very evil one is resisting. At least we need to
discuss this possibility, and in what is undoubtedly.the most controversial part of
this paper, I do so. 6 In Part I, I describe the micro-processes that would need to be
disrupted. Parts II, III, and IV outline various forms of political intervention that
might accomplish such a disruption. Part V assesses the available choices for what
is to be done.
I. THE MICRO-PROCESSES OF REPRESSION
As I have just mentioned, there are very powerful forces that have pushed us
toward the incarceration of an unprecedented number of our fellow citizens. But,
powerful as they are, these underlying forces probably could not have produced
this result without a supporting ideology that made the outcome acceptable. To see
this, we need to focus on just how remarkable that outcome is. From 1970 to
2009, the number of people incarcerated in the United States has grown from
196,429 to 2.25 million, an increase of more than 1000%.7 On a per capita basis,
detailed and persuasive account of the way that mass-incarceration has replaced chattel slavery, Jim
Crow, and the ghetto as methods of social control. See Loic Wacquant, The New 'Peculiar
Institution': On the Prison as Surrogate Ghetto, 4 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 377, 378 (2000): "Not
crime, but the need to shore up an eroding caste cleavage, along with buttressing the emergent regime
of desocialized wage labor to which most blacks are fated by virtue of their lack of marketable
cultural capital, and which the most deprived among them resist by escaping into the illegal street
economy, is the main impetus behind the stupendous expansion of America's penal state in the post-
Keynesian age and its de facto policy of 'carceral affirmative action toward African-Americans
[sic]."' See also ALEXANDER, supra note 1.
5 Cf THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED, supra note 4, at 62 (attributing the "social dislocation
among the ghetto underclass" to "shifts in the American economy.. .the historic flow of migrants,
changes in the urban minority age structure, population changes in the central city, and the class
transformation of the inner city.").
6 See infra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
Compare MARGARET WERNER CAHALAN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, HISTORICAL CORRECTION STATISTICS IN THE UNITED
STATES 1850-1984, at 35, 76 (1986), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/pr/102529.pdf
(196,429 incarcerated individuals in the U.S. in 1970) with HEATHER C. WEST, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, PRISON INMATES AT MIDYEAR
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these numbers put us far ahead of any other nation in the world.! And for the latter
part of this period, when most of the increase has come about, it has occurred
against the backdrop of a declining crime rate.9
As astounding as these outcomes are, they understate the impact on the
African American community. Black men are more than six times more likely to
be incarcerated than white men.'o Twenty percent of black men born between
1965 and 1969 have been imprisoned by the time they reach their early thirties."
According to Bruce Western, Meredith Kleykamp, and Jake Rosenfeld, "[twenty
nine] percent of black male [high school] dropouts under the age of [forty] were
behind bars on an average day in 2000."l12
All this has happened with a minimum of political opposition. Indeed, at least
until very recently, political pressures have favored higher, rather than lower rates
of incarceration. 3  Granted, the underlying causes of these trends are broad and
powerful. Still, we need to explain why such a large and disturbing transformation
occurred without triggering meaningful controversy. After all, the causes of global
warming are also broad and powerful, but the phenomenon has nonetheless
generated a political response. Why is there no comparable response to hyper-
incarceration?
2009-STATISTICAL TABLES, tbl. 2 (2010), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pim09st.pdf (2,297,400 imprisoned individuals in 2009).
8 See ROY WALMSLEY, INT'L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, KING'S COLLEGE LONDON, WORLD
PRISON POPULATION LIST 1 (8th ed. 2009) [hereinafter WORLD PRISON POPULATION] available at
http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depstallaw/research/icps/downloads/wppl-8th-41.pdf (reporting that the United
States has the highest prison population rate in the world with 756 incarcerated individuals per
100,000 in population, followed by Russia (629), Rwanda (604), St. Kitts & Nevis (588), and Cuba
(about 531)). When one includes people in administrative detention, China has the most total people
imprisoned. However, even by this measure, the U.S. leads the world in the per capita rate of
imprisonment. See James Forman, Why Care about Mass Incarceration?, 108 MICH. L. REV. 993,
1004 n.49 (2010), quoting Roy Walmsley, [WORLD PRISON POPULATION].
9 "Violent and property crime rates, including the rate of every type of violent and property crime
measured by the [National Crime Victimization Survey] declined between 1999 and 2008." By 2008, crime
rates were at or near their lowest levels in over three decades. See MICHAEL R. RAND, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, CRIMINAL VIcRtIzATION, 2008, at 1 (2009)
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv08.pdf.
10 WEST, supra note 7, at 2.
" See Becky Pettit & Bruce Western, Mass Imprisonment and the Life Course: Race and
Class Inequality in US. Incarceration, 69 AM. Soc. REv. 151, 151 (2004).
12 Bruce Western, Meredith Kleykamp, & Jake Rosenfeld, Crime, Punishment, and American
Inequality 7 (June 2003) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Princeton University), available at
http://inequality.princeton.edu/papers/western-crime.pdf
13 See, e.g., KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN POLITICS (1997); MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE (1999); STUART A. SCHEINGOLD,
THE POLITICS OF LAW AND ORDER: STREET CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY (1984). On the deep-seated
political structures that push toward increased incarceration rates, see William J. Stuntz, The
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REv. 505 (2001).
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The simple answer to this question is racism, and, unsurprisingly, racial
divisions are indeed part of the story. It does not follow, though, that racism-
defined as simple, irrational racial prejudice and animus-explains all that is
wrong. By insisting on this explanation, we run the risk of oversimplifying the
problem, and by insisting on this definition, we run the risk of oversimplifying
racism itself The explanation treats racism as a personal moral failing or an
irrational mistake, rather than as a self-perpetuating system that creates the very
conditions that seem to validate it. Moreover, and relatedly, the explanation
ignores (or seems to ignore) the real social dysfunctions that plague the inner-
cities. If we are to develop strategies of disruption, we need a more finely textured
description of the ideological structures that produce the political acquiescence
necessary to carry out a program of hyper-incarceration.
In previous work, I have written at some length about these structures,14 SO I
will do no more than briefly describe them here. The analysis starts with two
competing models for crime control. The economic model treats crime and efforts
to control crime as the rational response to incentives. On this model, the
government sets the price of crime at a level designed to produce the optimal
amount-that is, the level of crime such that the social cost of preventing the last
unit is just below the cost of the crime itself.15 Criminals and potential criminals,
in turn, treat the risk of punishment as a cost of doing business. They, too,
rationally calculate costs and benefits and commit crimes if, but only if, the benefit
they receive is greater than the threatened punishment, discounted by the
likelihood that it will be inflicted and appropriately adjusted according to taste for
risk.'6
A deficiency of the economic model is that it seems descriptively inaccurate,
or at least quite incomplete. Anyone who has studied the politics of crime control
knows that it is driven at least as much by anger and fear as by careful cost-benefit
calculations." Policy makers can talk openly about the costs and benefits of, say,
14 See Louis Michael Seidman, Points of Intersection: Discontinuities at the Junction of
Criminal Law and the Regulatory State, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 97 (1996); Louis Michael
Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the Problem of Crime Control, 94
YALE L.J. 315 (1984); Louis Michael Seidman, The Supreme Court, Entrapment, and Our Criminal
Justice Dilemma, 1981 SUP. CT. REv. 111 (1981).
1 For standard expositions of the model, see Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An
Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the
Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193 (1985).
16 See, e.g., David Pyle, Economists, Crime and Punishment, in THE ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS
OF CRIME 83, 84 (Nigel G. Fielding et al. eds., 2000); Samuel Kramer, An Economic Analysis of
Criminal Attempt: Marginal Deterrence and the Optimal Structure of Sanctions, 81 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 398,405-07 (1990).
17 See, e.g., DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 135-36, 191-92 (2001); Jonathan Simon, Fear and Loathing in Late
Modernity: Reflections on the Cultural Sources of Mass Imprisonment in the United States, in MASS
IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 15, 15 (David Garland ed., 2001). See generally
BECKETT, supra note 13.
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increasing the speed limit on highways, but no one says publicly that there is an
optimal level of rape and murder. It is not surprising then, that our actual policies
depart substantially from the results we would attain if we focused solely on
economic efficiency. For example, Bruce Western estimates that from 1993 to
2001, increases in incarceration rates produced a two to five percent drop in
serious crime at a cost of $53 billion.'" This figure represents just the direct
economic costs of imprisonment. It includes none of the huge costs to individual
lives and communities imposed by our gargantuan imprisonment program.
Whether any particular drop in crime is worth the cost obviously depends on how
one values crime avoidance, but almost everyone would say that this is an
exorbitant price to pay for relatively insignificant benefits. Of course, not
everyone agrees with Western's analysis,' 9 but even if he is wrong, there can be no
doubt that, for example, our current practice of incarcerating superannuated
prisoners who continue to serve very long sentences into their dotage involves a
great deal of waste.20
On the other side of the ledger, it is extremely implausible that the threat of
punishment alone motivates most people to obey the law, and it is obviously not
true that most people need to be incapacitated to prevent crime. I do not mean to
endorse the more radical assertion that deterrence does not work at all, that the
threat of punishment is unnecessary, or that incapacitation is always illegitimate.
The precise effects of deterrence are disputed, and it is doubtful that there is a
linear relationship between the extent of punishment and the extent of deterrence.2 1
Still, at least on a gross level, deterrence probably works at the margin, and it is at
18 According to Western's analysis, ninety percent of the decrease in crime that occurred
during this period would have happened even if there had been no increase in incarceration rates.
During the period he studied, the rates for state prisoners went from 725,000 to 1.2 million, or an
increase of sixty-six percent. Assuming the annual cost of incarcerating an individual is $22,000 per
year, Western estimated that a two to five percent decrease in serious crime was purchased at a cost
of $53 billion. See WESTERN, supra note 1, at 186-87.
1 For example, Stephen Levitt estimates that the increased incarceration rate during the same
period produced more than a thirty percent reduction in violent crime and more than a twenty percent
reduction in property crime. See Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s: Four
Factors that Explain the Decline and Six that Do Not, 18 J. EcoN. PERSP. 163, 184 (2004). For
similar estimates, see William Spelman, The Limited Importance of Prison Expansion, in THE CRIME
DROP IN AMERICA 97 (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds., 2000).
20 There is widespread agreement that the propensity to commit criminal acts peaks in the
teen years and then declines quickly as individuals reach adulthood. See, e.g., David Farrington, Age
and Crime, 7 CRIME & JUST. 189, 189 (1986); Darrell J. Steffensmeier, Emilie Andersen Allan, Miles
D. Harer, & Cathy Streifel, Age and the Distribution of Crime, 94 AM J. Soc. 803, 826 (1989); Charles
R. Tittle & Harold G. Grasmick, Criminal Behavior and Age: A Test of Three Provocative
Hypotheses, J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 309, 342 (1997), although there is disagreement about the
causal mechanism that produces this result. See Farrington, supra at 230-33.
21 See generally Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know about Criminal
Deterrence, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765 (2010).
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least possible that the margin is quite large.22 Similarly, it is doubtless true that
some people who are incapacitated would commit further crimes if released. But
these observations in no way contradict the further assertion that the vast majority
of people would obey the law (or at least most laws) even if they were not worried
about punishment. Put differently, we would live in a very different world if
everyone committed every crime that they thought they could get away with.
Standing in opposition to the economic model is the moralism model. On this
model, punishment designed to achieve the purely instrumental goals at the base of
the economic model is impermissible. Instead, the government should punish
crime on the basis of moral desert, and the extent of punishment should be
calibrated to the extent of blame.23 The targets of potential criminal sanctions, in
turn, do not, or do not only, calculate costs and benefits. Rather, most of them
desist from crime because they have internalized the same standards of
blameworthiness that motivate and justify the threatened punishment.
The moralism model may be more descriptively accurate than the economic
model, but it suffers from problems of its own. The central difficulty is that it rests
on ideas about free will, blameworthiness, and desert that are disputed at best and
totally incoherent at worst.24 True, there may be widely shared intuitions about
polar cases and about the general structure of moral desert,25 although even this
point is disputed.2 6 But even within this general agreement, if indeed such an
agreement exists, there is no obvious and uncontroversial algorithm that converts
these intuitions into an exact ranking of relative blameworthiness or, more
importantly, into precise levels of punishment.27 The effort to define these
22 See, e.g., JOHANNES ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE (1974). On the importance
of thinking about deterrence at the margin, see George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement ofLaws,
78 J. POL. ECON. 526 (1970); Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions ofEmotion in
Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1996). For some important qualifications, see Neal Kumar
Katyal, Deterrence's Difficulty, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2385 (1997).
23 The classic statement of this position is in IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS
OF JUSTICE 100-01 (J. Ladd, trans., The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1965). For useful modem
restatements, see Milton Goldinger, Punishment, Justice, and the Separation of Issues, 49 MONIST
458 (1965); K. G. ARMSTRONG, The Retributivist Hits Back, 70 MIND 471 (1961).
24 The best exploration of these themes is still Mark Kelman, Interpretative Construction in
the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REv. 591 (198 1).
25 See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of
Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829, 1892 (2007) (arguing that "human intuitions of justice about core
wrongdoing-both the sense that serious wrongdoing should be punished and the sense of the relative
seriousness of wrongdoing-are deep, predictable, and widely shared.") For argument that ordinary
individuals have an intuitive sense of "moral grammar," see John Mikhail, Moral Grammar and
Intuitive Jurisprudence: A Formal Model of Unconscious Moral and Legal Knowledge, 50 PSYCHOL.
LEARNING & MOTIVATION 28 (2009).
26 See Donald Braman, Dan M. Kahan, & David A. Hoffman, Some Realism About
Punishment Naturalism, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1531 (2010) (claiming that empirical research
demonstrates deep disagreements over what constitutes a wrongful act and how wrongful it is).
27 Cf Robinson & Kurzban, supra note 25, at 1892 (conceding that there are disagreements
about relative blameworthiness of wrongdoing outside of core cases).
114 [ Vol 9: 1
2011] HYPER-INCARCERATIONAND STRATEGIES OFDISRUPTION
gradations rests on extremely problematic assumptions about moral agency--
assumptions that cannot be proved empirically and that may well make no sense
philosophically.
In the real world, of course, both the economic and the moral model are at
work on both the law enforcement and potential criminal side of the ledger. The
amount of crime and incarceration we end up with may be crucially influenced by
the balance between the two models. For present purposes, though, the important
points are not just that each model has problems of its own, but also that the
interaction between the two models can produce pathological outcomes.
To see the difficulty, we must first notice that the bright line I have so far
drawn between the two models can be misleading. Each model has a tendency to
collapse into the other. Thus, even if we were fully committed to the economic
model, it is still likely that the most economically efficient way to produce a low
level of crime at low cost is to inculcate moral inhibitions against criminal activity.
Norms of this sort will prevent people from committing crimes even when doing
so is personally advantageous. Society therefore need not bear the costs of making
criminal activity personally disadvantageous. In a world where people have not
absorbed these norms, the probability of detection and severity of punishment
needs to be extremely high in order to reduce crime to acceptable levels.
Even from the economic point of view, then, it makes sense for criminal
sanctions to be imposed--or at least to be seen to be imposed-on a moral basis.
After all, if the government itself treats criminal punishment as no more than the
cost of doing business, why should a potential criminal treat it any differently? If,
instead, the government treats criminal punishment as an expressive act that
conveys moral condemnation, there is at least some chance that potential criminals
will internalize desirable moral norms.28 And even if that hope is not realized-
even if the potential criminals remain hard-hearted profit maximizers-they will
still have to add the cost of public condemnation to their overall cost-benefit
calculus.
Just as the economic model tends toward collapse into the moral model, so
too the moral model tends toward collapse into the economic model. As noted
above, our standards for blameworthiness cannot withstand serious analysis.
Many others have shown that if one takes a broad enough view, all criminal
conduct is in some sense caused by factors beyond the subject's control and for
which she is not to blame. Conversely, if one takes a narrow enough view, all
criminal conduct is caused by an act of will for which the subject is to blame.
Sometimes we take a broad view, sometimes we take a narrow view, and, despite
heroic efforts by many apologists for the criminal justice system, no one has
adequately justified this shift in focus. 29
28 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 591,
603 (1996) (arguing that "[t]he law can discourage criminality not just by 'raising the cost' of such
behavior through punishments, but also through instilling aversions to the kinds of behavior that the
law prohibits.").
29 See, e.g., Kelman, supra note 24, at 593-94.
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In the face of this philosophical incoherence, it is easy for culpability
standards to turn into efficiency standards. We end up blaming when it is useful to
blame. Whether it is useful, in turn, depends on a cost-benefit analysis. So, for
example, conduct is sometimes coded as not "blameworthy" because it is not
deterrable at a reasonable cost, rather than because it does not violate Kantian
principles.3 o Similarly, sometimes we seem to determine blameworthiness by
selfishly, if unconsciously, calculating the risk of being victimized by crime
against the risk of being labeled a criminal.'
The intersection of the economic and moral models and the tendency of each
to collapse into the other produce serious pathologies. Consider first the economic
side of the ledger. Punishment as blame may indeed be economically efficient, but
it achieves this efficiency only if its economic motivation is obscured. Blaming is
instrumentally effective precisely because it is perceived to be motivated by
moralism. Problems therefore arise when those threatened by criminal sanctions
begin to believe that the punishment is economically motivated. Ironically, the
problems only deepen if the punishment is in fact morally motivated.
We can see why this is so by examining the moralism side of the ledger. As I
have argued above, in the absence of good non-instrumental standards for blaming,
the practice tends to devolve into an unconscious cost-benefit analysis.32 Given
this fact, it is not surprising that mainstream groups and target groups develop
different culpability standards. Being labeled a criminal is different for the two
groups. People in isolated, economically marginal circumstances suffer more
criminal violence than those who are better off but they also suffer much more
state violence at the hands of police and prosecutors. Because of this difference,
members of the target community will have different views of relative culpability
for the same act done under the same circumstances. To be clear, the two
communities need not disagree on fundamental questions of right and wrong. It is
enough that the target community perceives the calibration of moral fault to the
30 See H. L. A. Hart, Legal Responsibility and Excuses, in DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM IN THE
AGE OF MODERN SCIENCE 95, 107-08 (Sidney Hook, ed., Collier Books 1961) (describing the view
that "the rationale of excuse is not ... that the accused should in view of his mental condition be
excused whatever the effect of this on others, but rather the mere fact that excusing him will not harm
society by reducing the efficacy of the law's threats for others.").
31 See, e.g., CLAYTON A. HARTJEN, CRIME AND CRIMINALIZATION 13 (2d ed. 1978) ("the
criminalization process is contingent on a variety of forces and circumstances relating to the relative
threat some person's (or group's) behavior poses for those who seek to repress it, and the relative
power of each to either impose its will on the other or to ward off the effort to impose a criminal
label."); Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Control and the Psychology of Blame, 126 PSYCHOL. BULL. 556,
569 (2000) ("[R]esearch has shown that blame and responsibility attributions are influenced by
factors such as a victim's or perpetrator's personality, . . . social attractiveness, . . . or status.");
Donald A. Dripps, Fundamental Retribution Error: Criminal Justice and the Social Psychology of
Blame, 56 VAND. L. REv. 1383, 1388 (2003) ("[a]lthough people tend to attribute their own
misconduct to external constraints, they tend to attribute the behavior of others to personality rather
than context.").
32 See generally supra notes 28-31.
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degree of punishment to be out of kilter, or that it believes that the norms are being
applied more harshly to them than to others."
Under these circumstances, the target community will see itself as being
unfairly singled out. It will see the dominant community as not really following
moral norms, but instead acting in its narrow self-interest. Moral incentives to
obey will, therefore, erode and be replaced by mere economic incentives because,
from a moral point of view, the threat of punishment is perceived to be unjust.
Avoiding criminal sanctions turns into little more than a prudential concern.
Because the risk of imprisonment is just the cost of doing business, the level of
crime rises.
If the dominant group were in fact motivated by the economic model, it might
recognize that more lenient sanctions would in fact produce greater crime
prevention and, so, back off. Precisely because it is morally motivated however, a
stable equilibrium is out of reach. When the target group commits more crimes,
the mainstream community becomes more morally indignant, which, in turn, leads
to still harsher sanctions. Targets of these sanctions feel even more unfairly
treated, so they feel even less moral obligation to obey the law. Their still more
"outrageous" conduct produces more moral anger, and yet harsher sanctions.
The story I have told so far does not mention racial or class prejudice. Of
course, perceptions of moral division are most likely to arise when there is already
racial stigma and stereotyping. The important point, though, is that once the cycle
begins, the perception of "otherness" becomes self-reinforcing and remains even if
racism and classism (at least in the standard sense of those terms) were somehow
to drop out of the picture.
Because the targets perceive themselves as unfairly singled out, their conduct
is less constrained by majority moral norms, and, so, they in fact become "other."
This dynamic explains how hyper-incarceration can coexist with the emergence of
a black middle class, the election of a black President, and a perceived decline in
racial tension. The successful emergence of some African Americans from a
segregated world dominated by poverty and racial concentration serves only to
further narrow and isolate the target, thereby increasing its disconnection from
mainstream norms,34 which, in turn, reinforces mainstream perception of
3 On the growing divergence between the way that the majority community and minority
communities perceive crime and criminals, see Victor M. Rios, The Hypercriminalization of Black
and Latino Male Youth in the Era of Mass Incarceration, in RACIALIZING JUSTICE, DISENFRANCHISING
LIVES: THE RACISM, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AND LAW READER (Manning Marable, Ian Steinberg, &
Keesha Middlemass, eds., 2007); MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND
PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 37-38 (1995); John Hagan & Holly Foster, Profiles of Punishment and
Privilege: Secret and Disputed Deviance during the Racialized Transition to American Adulthood, 46
CRIME L. & Soc. CHANGE 65, 66 (2006).
34 See Richard Thompson Ford, Barack is the New Black: Obama and the Promise/Threat of
the Post-Civil Rights Era, 6 DuBolS REv. 37, 43 (2009) ("Today there are, effectively, at least two
Black communities: an increasingly prosperous and well-educated professional class and an
increasingly isolated, poorly socialized, and demoralized underclass. These two Black communities
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"otherness." Negative stereotypes about the remaining target population come to
seem normal and empirically justified, while the nagging fear of racism is quieted
by the counterexamples of African Americans who are "assimilated." The fragile
"assimilated" status of these African Americans, in turn, rests crucially on their
ability to separate themselves from the despised underclass that is left behind. The
racial solidarity that might otherwise ameliorate the isolation therefore fails to take
hold.3 s
Hyper-incarceration itself further intensifies this isolation. Incarcerated
individuals become nonpersons. They are hidden from our view and have little
contact with the outside world. They cannot vote or assert themselves politically
in any meaningful way. Moreover, individuals returning to their communities after
a period of imprisonment find their family lives shattered, their community ties
disrupted, and paths toward meaningful employment blocked." No wonder, then,
that the recidivism rate is very high and that the prospects of forming political and
affective links with those in the mainstream community are so bleak.
This is undoubtedly a dismal picture. Are there political strategies that might
disrupt the self-reinforcing downward cycle that permits hyper-incarceration? In
the Sections that follow, I explore three possibilities.
II. THE POLITICS OF AMELIORATION
One set of strategies forsakes the goal of "solving" the hyper-incarceration
crisis, at least in the short term. The problem is just too big and the underlying
causes too powerful to expect us to return immediately to anything approaching a
sane balance between crime and punishment. But we should not let the best be the
enemy of the good. While we await a permanent solution, or, indeed even if a
permanent solution never comes, there are things that can be done in the here-and-
now that will improve the situation.
Consider first strategies directed toward the economic model. These
strategies attempt to make criminal punishment more costly, thereby changing the
balance of costs and benefits of incarceration. The most venerable method of
raising costs is the exploitation of criminal procedure liberalism. Of course,
criminal procedure liberals must publicly deny that they are simply attempting to
obstruct the criminal process. Instead, they must paint themselves as believers in
virtues like the "rule of law," the control of government overreaching, and the
protection of constitutional rights. Doubtless, many criminal procedure liberals are
are joined by a shared history but increasingly divided by lifestyle, values, norms of behavior, and
life prospects"). Cf THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED, supra note 4, at 144.
3s See generally James Forman, The Black Poor, the Black Elites, and American Prisons, 32
CARDOZo L. REv. 791 (2011).
36 See, e.g., WESTERN, supra note 1, at 163 (discussing the effect of incarceration on family
connections and community ties); id. at 109 (discussing the effect of incarceration on employment
opportunities).
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totally sincere about their motives. Nonetheless, even if they are skeptical of these
stated objectives, opponents of mass incarceration can exploit arguments along
these lines to make criminal punishment more costly while sidestepping the
pathologies described above.
Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation
Clause provide a recent example. The Court has held that the government must
produce live testimony by laboratory technicians who perform forensic tests rather
than rely upon a written report.37 Justice Scalia, a conservative textualist who
exhibits no apparent concern about hyper-incarceration, wrote this decision along
with others reinvigorating the Confrontation Clause. 38  On their face, these
decisions seem to have nothing to do with the micro-processes described above or,
indeed, with hyper-incarceration at all. No doubt, Justice Scalia was focused
instead on interpretation of text, original public meaning, and respect for
constitutional principle. Yet these decisions have the effect of making the
prosecution of at least some kinds of cases more costly, and for that reason,
opponents of hyper-incarceration should encourage them. If prosecution resources
remain static as costs rise, the result will be better plea bargains for defendants that
will result in shorter sentences.
Ironically, the Confrontation Clause cases and other decisions like them have
this economic effect precisely because they appear to be motivated by
noneconomic factors. On standard liberal accounts, rights must be protected even
if it is instrumentally useful to ignore them.39 Thus, the argument that requiring
live testimony by laboratory technicians will be costly and is not worth the benefit
runs up against the claim that constitutional rights have no price tag. This relative
imperviousness to cost, in turn, provides political space for costs to be raised,
thereby producing salutary results.
In a similar fashion, death penalty opponents have been quite successful in
exploiting procedural rights to raise the costs of capital punishment, to the point
where some jurisdictions simply cannot afford to kill.4 0 Prison reform litigation,
" Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
3 See also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 83
(2006). But cf Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011) (statements not testimonial under the
Confrontation Clause when their primary purpose was to help police meet emergency).
3 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 133-34, 268-74 (1977).
4 Consider, for example, the case of Brian Gene Nichols. During an escape attempt, Nichols
murdered a judge, a court reporter, a deputy sheriff, and a federal agent. Two of the murders
occurred before several eyewitnesses, and Nichols confessed to all the crimes. He also offered to
plead guilty in exchange for a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole, but the
prosecution insisted on seeking the death penalty. Over the next several years, the state paid $2.9
million to prosecute Nichols. As a direct result, Georgia has lacked the money to bring other capital
cases to trial. For example, Jamie Ryan Weiss, an accused murderer, has been in jail for nearly four
years without trial because the state cannot afford to pay for a defense attorney. For news accounts
detailing these facts, see Manuel Roig-Franzia & Melanie Lasoff Levs, 3 Slain in Atlanta Courthouse
Rampage, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2005, at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A28346-2005Marl Lhtml; Brian Nichol's Defense Tab Put at $2.9 Million, THE ASSOCIATED
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when it is successful, makes prisons more humane, but from an economic point of
view the more important effect is to make prisons more costly and their use less
41
attractive. More broadly, enforcement of Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights
raise the cost of catching and prosecuting criminal suspects.
In more subtle ways, the "innocence" movement accomplishes similar ends.
With the advent of DNA testing, it has become apparent that many more innocent
defendants are convicted than apologists for our broken system have supposed.42
Concerns about "actual innocence" point the way toward more effective assistance
of counsel, less reliance on unsupported eye witness identification, and more
access to post-conviction remedies.
Superficially, it might be thought that these concerns relate to the moralism
model. After all, incarcerated people who are innocent are hardly blameworthy. If
this were the only effect of the movement, though, it would do little to relieve
hyper-incarceration. It is true that the criminal justice system reaches less reliable
results than many have supposed, but no one thinks that releasing every innocent
prisoner tomorrow would put even a dent in hyper-incarceration. 43 Instead, the
main impact of the innocence movement may be to raise the costs of incarcerating
the innocent and guilty alike. Increased concern about wrongful conviction
translates into more procedural protections, which, in turn, mean, once again,
better plea bargains offered by overextended prosecutors. It is politically possible
to raise these economic costs precisely because protection of the innocent is
thought to be morally required even when the protection is economically
inefficient.
These strategies use the moralism model instrumentally to accomplish
economic goals. Other ameliorative strategies, in contrast, target moral intuitions
directly. They attempt to soften both mainstream and target community attitudes.
On the one hand, they try to induce the mainstream to be more understanding of
the constrained choices available to members of the target community. On the
PRESs (July 22, 2009, 9:46 AM) http://www.Accessnorthga.com/detail.php?n-221972&c=6; Bill Rankin,
Case Could Decide Whether Georgia Can Afford the Death Penalty, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL-
CONsTITUTION (Nov. 10, 2009, 6:04 PM), http//www.aje.com/news/Atlanta/case-could-decide-
whether-192386.html; Jeffrey Toobin, Death in Georgia: The High Price of Trying to Save an
Infamous Killer's Life, THE NEW YORKER (Feb. 4, 2008),
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/02/04/080204fa_factjtoobin.
41 See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011) (upholding lower court order mandating
reduction of state prison population by as much as 46,000 inmates because of constitutional
deficiencies in health care).
42 According to Stuart Taylor Jr. and K.C. Johnson, since 1989, DNA evidence has
exonerated more than two hundred prisoners including fourteen death row inmates. See STUART
TAYLOR JR. & K.C. JOHNSON, UNTIL PROVEN INNOCENT: POLITICAL CORRECTNESS AND THE SHAMEFUL
INJUSTICES OF THE DUKE LACROSSE RAPE CASE 362-65 (2007). See generally JIM DWYER, PETER
NEUFELD, & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND How To MAKE
IT RIGHT (2003).
43 See generally Abbe Smith, In Praise of the Guilty Project: A Criminal Defense Lawyer's
Growing Anxiety about Innocence Projects, 13 U. PA. J.L. & Soc. CHANGE 315 (2010).
120 [Vol 9: I
2011] HYPER-INCARCERATION AND STRATEGIES OF DISRUPTION
other hand, they try to induce members of the target community to assume more of
the "personal responsibility" that the mainstream community expects.
For example, numerous jurisdictions now have "drug courts" where drug
abusers are diverted from prison and instead provided with social services
reinforced by the threat of ultimate incarceration if they fail to comply." The
theory behind the programs is that social intervention will make individuals
conform to mainstream standards without necessitating their removal from the
community. On a more general scale, there is emerging evidence that the
rehabilitative ideal may have been too quickly dismissed by its critics. In a few
places, serious and hopeful experiments in rehabilitation are beginning to take
place.45
These programs are directed at the target community. Other programs
attempt to reform the mainstream community or attempt to change the attitudes of
both groups. For example, my colleague James Forman has suggested a sweeping
and visionary program modeled on "Teach for America" that would induce middle
class young people to enter prisons where they would educate prisoners. The
program is aimed partially at the rehabilitation of prisoners, but, perhaps more
importantly, it is also aimed at changing the attitudes of the young people who
teach the prisoners. The hope is that the teachers will identify with their pupils and
that, after leaving the program, they will form a dedicated alumni cadre that might
significantly impact the politics of incarceration.
Forman's program is only a proposal, but for many years, Lori Pompa has
actually run a program called Inside-Out that is motivated by similar goals. 46
Unlike Forman's proposal, where the students teach the inmates, Inside-Out treats
undergraduates and inmates as equals. As described in its website, the program
4 According to the National Drug Intelligence Center, there are now 2,038 drug courts active in all
fifty states. NATIONAL DRUG INTELLIGENCE CENTER, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL DRUG THREAT
ASSESSMENT 2010 at 6 (Feb. 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs38/38661p.pdf. For some
examples of studies of the cost effectiveness of drug courts, see NATIONAL INSTTrTE OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF
JUSTICE PROGRAMS, DRUG COURTS: THE SECOND DECADE, 27-31 (2006), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/211081.pdf, Shannon M. Carey et al., Cahfornia Drug Courts: Outcomes,
Costs, and Promising Practices: An Overview ofPhase II in a Statewide Study, 3 J. PSYCHOACrIVE DRUGS 345
(2006).
45 For some examples, see Dora Schriro, Correcting Corrections: Missouri's Parallel
Universe, in U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SENTENCING & CORRECTIONS: ISSUES FOR THE 21 CENTURY 1 (2000);
JANEEN BucK WILUSON et al., THE URBAN INSTITUTE, EVALUATION OF THE RIDGE HOUSE RESIDENTIAL
PROGRAM: FINAL REPORT (May 2010), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/gnmts/230741.pdf;
Daniel J. Bayse, Scot M. Allgood, & Paul H. Van Wyk, Family Life Education: An Effective Tool for
Prisoner Rehabilitation, 40 FAMILY RELATIONS 254 (1991). See generally J. Stephen Wormith et al.,
The Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Offenders: The Current Landscape and Some Future
Directions for Correctional Psychology, 34 CRIMI. JUST. & BEHAV. 879 (2007).
46 See About Us, THE INSIDE-OUT CENTER, http://wwwinsideoutcenter.org/about-us.html
(2010).
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brings college students together with incarcerated men and women to
study as peers in a seminar behind prison walls. The core of the Inside-
Out Program is a semester-long academic course, meeting once a week,
through which 15 to 18 "outside" (i.e. undergraduate) students and the
same number of "inside" (i.e. incarcerated) students attend class together
inside prison.47
Instead of focusing on the relationship between students and inmates, the
restorative justice movement seeks to reconcile criminals with their victims.
Offenders are made to see the damage that they have caused and, when the
program works, to feel and express remorse. Victims, in turn, come to feel more at
peace with their loss and, perhaps, to forgive the offenders. On both sides, anger,
fear, and misunderstanding give way to a shared moral vision.4
What are we to make of these and other ameliorative efforts? Some of them
undoubtedly soften the system's brutality. Still, there are reasons for caution.
Three difficulties in particular are worthy of attention.
First, we must confront the familiar problems of legitimation and redirected
anger. Ameliorative measures can make things slightly better, but they can also
make them a lot worse by reinforcing ideological defenses against more
fundamental change. This risk is especially acute for criminal procedure
liberalism. No doubt, criminal procedure protections raise the costs of detection
and conviction of criminals. Unfortunately, they also reinforce the widespread
belief that hyper-incarceration is morally justified. Perhaps it is not merely
coincidence that the United States has both the world's most detailed and
constricting criminal procedure rules and the highest incarceration rate. 49 The
strictness of the rules may convince people that the criminal suspects who manage
to make their way through all of the procedural filters are the worst of the worst.
Our thick network of procedures makes it appear that anyone who does not deserve
the harsh treatment we hand out will not receive it. Worse yet, lingering anger at
the criminals who remain unpunished because of, say, the Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule, gets redirected at those criminals we can get our hands on.
47 See id.
48 For collections of articles on the restorative justice movement, see RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
(Declan Roche, ed., 2004); RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CIVIL SOCIETY (Heather Strang & John
Braithwaite, eds., 2001). See generally DECLAN ROCHE, ACCOUNTABILITY IN RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
(2003).
49 See, e.g., Charles Fried, Reflections on Crime and Punishment, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 681,
690 (1997) (asserting that US has the most elaborate procedures in the world for determining who is
punished and the largest prison population in the industrialized world); William T. Pizzi, Punishment
and Procedure: A Diferent View of the American Criminal Justice System, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 55,
66 (1996) (arguing that it is "not an accident that a country with a system of criminal procedure that is
the most complicated and the most expensive in the western world and, if the truth be known, a trial
system that is not very reliable, would also turn out to have a system that threatens, and sometimes
inflicts, punishments that are harsh compared to those in other countries.").
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A second problem is that programs that might produce real benefits when
considered by themselves inevitably become corrupted by the malfunctions of the
system in which they are embedded. Restorative justice and drug courts are
particularly susceptible to this corruption. Both of these programs attempt to
induce a moral, rather than economic point of view among the target group. But in
a world where the moral and economic are already closely intertwined, there is
again a risk that one will collapse into the other. Thus, from a moral point of view,
a perpetrator who admits to his crime, apologizes, and reconciles with his victim is
indeed less worthy of punishment. So is a drug user who comes to recognize the
power that drugs hold over him and accepts counseling to overcome the problem.
But economically motivated criminals know that punishment can be avoided by
feigning a moral attitude, and, so, they will submit for instrumental rather than
moral reasons.50 Meanwhile, those in charge of the punishment apparatus are
aware of this opportunity for manipulation, and that awareness is bound to create
cynicism.5 ' Perhaps after they are tricked a few times, they become skeptical
about the prospects of true reconciliation. The upshot is not mutual understanding
and a breaking down of barriers, but more mutual distrust and hatred.
Finally, ameliorative strategies are problematic because they tend to be self-
limiting. After all, if they were not self-limiting, they would not be merely
ameliorative. For example, there is only limited benefit that can be derived from
the ideological commitment to non-instrumental rights. As discussed above,
vindication of these rights makes imprisonment more expensive. But there is
always the risk that policymakers will respond by bearing the increased cost rather
than by reducing rates of incarceration. Alternatively, if the rights become
expensive enough, there is a risk that the ideology will be abandoned. Criminal
procedure liberalism has ameliorated brutality to some extent, but it has also
produced a considerable backlash precisely because it is thought to be too costly in
terms of crime prevention.52
Other ameliorative strategies are self-limiting because they are directed
primarily at low hanging fruit. Consider, for example, proposals to flood the
prison with idealistic young college and law students. The proposals are worth
pursuing for the good they will do on their own terms, and it is possible that, if
implemented, they will mobilize a group of people dedicated to reform. Still, it
would be foolish to suppose that programs like this will produce large scale social
change. Young people willing to volunteer for such service are likely to be already
inclined toward empathic connections to prisoners. People without this empathic
link will not volunteer, and it is precisely those people who are the source of most
5o See WlLLIAM IAN MILLER, FAKING IT 76 (2003) (noting that "[alpologies are driven with
suspect motives" and that "[i]n a nutshell, the problem is that remorse is easy to fake"). For a
discussion of the risks that apologies will be corrupted by the instrumental exigencies of adjudication,
see Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification ofApology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135 (2000).
51 See generally Taft, supra note 50.
52 See, e.g., FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND (1970).
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of the problem. We do not have to speculate about these limitations. For all of its
laudable good work, no one claims that Inside-Out, which has been in existence for
thirteen years,5 3 has put a dent in hyper-incarceration.
Just as programs aimed at the mainstream community tend to preach to those
already converted, so too, programs aimed at the target community reach only a
small subset of the relevant population. Drug courts are wonderful, but it is
fanciful to assume that social services are going to address more serious violent
crime and the deep social malfunctions that cause it. Restorative justice has the
most praiseworthy of ambitions and may even do some good, but it is simply naive
to suppose that individual reconciliation between a few criminals and victims will
heal the huge social rift that has produced our current difficulties.
III. THE POLITICS OF TRANSFORMATION
Understanding the problems with ameliorative approaches naturally leads us
to ask whether we can do better. Suppose we forsake the goal of modest piecemeal
reform and aim instead at radical transformation. Strategies of this sort rest on the
supposed fragile and vulnerable character of the ideology that justifies the system.
On this view, it may seem that this system is impregnable, but that is only an
illusion. The careful and relentless exposure of the hypocrisy, brutality, and
injustice at the base of the system can bring it down.
These strategies are closely allied to important strands of the critical legal
studies movement. Some people allied with the movement ("crits") believed that
the internal contradictions of liberalism could be exploited to such an extent that
the system could be revealed for what it is-an empty shell that supports power
and privilege only so long as we allow it to do so.54
Projects along these lines would, for example, explore the contradictions in
mainstream accounts of blameworthiness. Moral condemnation, on this view,
amounts to no more than an ideological cover for the exercise of power by some
people over others.55 It does not follow, though, that the economic model can
simply replace the moral model. It, too, rests on unchallenged assumptions about
what, precisely, counts as a "cost" and a "benefit"-about who is benefited and on
whom the costs are imposed.5 6
Once we clear away the ideological detritus, we are left with a simple
question: Do we really want to live in a decent society? Critical Legal Studies has
many strands and many of its adherents had complicated positions. Still, at least in
their optimistic moods, many crits thought that, with the freedom provided by
5 See THE INSIDE-OUT CENTER, supra note 46.
54 See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 269-79 (1987).
s5 Cf Kelman, supra note 24.
56 Cf Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis ofEntitlement Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN.
L. REv. 387,388 (1981).
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deconstruction of constraining structures of thought, people would make the right
decision.5 7
I must confess to more than a little attraction to this way of thinking. A fair
amount of my own work has been influenced by it. As a serious strategy for
producing change, though, it leaves much to be desired. One problem with
focusing on micro-processes is that they may be more deeply embedded than some
crits supposed.
It is true that as a logical or intellectual matter the justificatory standards that
shield the criminal justice system from criticism are quite vulnerable. No one has
provided a good answer to the arguments deconstructing free will on the one hand
and instrumental rationality on the other, at least as they apply to our practices of
criminal punishment. It is nonetheless simply a mistake to suppose that these
structures of thought will collapse once they are shown to be incoherent. They
reflect ways of living and perceiving, rather than merely intellectual arguments. It
will not do to try to dismantle them so as to damage the system they protect; they
are impervious to attack precisely because they protect that system.
Nor is it obvious that if the structures were somehow dismantled, their
collapse would produce a more humane system. The structures serve functions
that would have to be served by something else if they disappeared. On the one
hand, belief in personal responsibility and the possibility of moral choice is, itself,
a determinant of behavior. Without it, there might well be more crime. On the
other hand, cost-benefit analysis is a check on wanton and purposeless brutality.
Without it, there might well be more punishment.
As Meir Dan-Cohen pointed out years ago, we would be well served if we
could maintain "acoustic separation" between the mainstream and target
communities." We could then inculcate personal responsibility in the target
community, thereby reducing crime, while convincing the mainstream community
that members of the target community have very constricted choices, thereby
reducing punishment. We could convince the target community that it is
instrumentally rational to obey the law because of the strong possibility of
punishment, while convincing the mainstream community of the instrumental
rationality of reducing punishment levels. But nobody has a clue how to maintain
such separation or, indeed, how to induce either set of beliefs in the first place. In
any event, advocates of radical transformation want to dismantle these false
categories altogether, rather than maintaining them for separate communities.
Moreover, even if a frontal assault on justificatory rationales were a more
promising strategy, we would still need to give it some specific programmatic
5 For an example of the optimistic strain in Critical Legal Studies scholarship, see Robert W.
Gordon, Unfreezing Legal Reality: Critical Approaches to Law, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 195, 220
(1987) ("If the resigned and complacent arguments turn out, over and over again, to be wrong, it may
be that after all it is possible that altruism, community, democratic participation, equality, and so
forth, can be promoted without destroying freedom and economic efficiency.")
ss See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
Criminal Law, 97 HARv. L. REv. 625 (1984).
125
OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW
content. Ameliorative strategies have their limits and problems, but at least they
consist of real proposals that are being, or might actually be, implemented. What
kind of program does radical deconstruction entail?
It is not only naive but also inexcusably solipsistic to suppose that writing law
review articles is such a program. Perhaps localized subversion holds out greater
promise,59 but there is a remaining vagueness about what this subversion would
consist of. In any event, as invigorating and liberating as these individual acts of
defiance may be, the chance of their sparking a global change seems quite remote.
A program of large-scale organization of target communities and building
bridges based on racial solidarity between those communities and mainstream
African Americans seems more promising. But there is no need to rehearse yet
again the difficulties of mobilizing dispirited and isolated minority communities,
the powerful reasons middle class African Americans have for distancing
themselves from those communities, or the panicked opposition among the
privileged that such organization produces. Moreover, even in this context, the
problem of programmatic content remains. If organizers offer no practical
programs at all, they appear unreasonable and utopian. If they offer such
programs, they fall back into the amelioration trap.
In any event, as a comfortable, wealthy, white academic, I am afraid that I am
not about to start knocking on doors in the inner city. As a personal matter, I
nonetheless remain committed to the practice of dismantling justificatory
categories, but people like me need to give up on the absurd claim that doing so
promises immediate social transformation. The categories deserve attack because
they are false and constricting. The people who argue for them deserve censure
because they should know better and because their arguments provide a cover for
an unjust status quo. Acts of rebellion, whether in law reviews or as localized
subversion, are good in themselves. But no one should suppose that these acts will
ultimately solve our problems. And, in the meantime, the waste and suffering from
hyper-incarceration goes on unabated.
IV. THE POLITICS OF ACCOMMODATION
Suppose that instead of reforming the micro-processes, we attempt to harness
them for our own purposes. Could we use a kind of reverse English to set these
powerful forces in a different direction? There is no getting around it: Some of the
proposals I consider in this section are ugly. They assume-indeed promote-
callousness, racism, and selfishness. But these are desperate times. If these
impulses can be made to work for good causes, then we should consider using
them.
In fact, there are aspects of conservative thought-of varying degrees of
respectability-that support an attack on hyper-incarceration. At the base of all of
5 For a defense, see Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy,
32 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 591, 609-11 (1982).
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them is recognition of the fact that hyper-incarceration is a big, bloated,
government program, with all the negative connotations that conservatives
regularly attach to that label. Apart from the defense establishment, it is hard to
think of another activity of government that involves so many people, such a large
share of the public fisc, and so much waste. Moreover, hyper-incarceration is not
just any big government program. It is a massive experiment in social engineering.
Like, say welfare or a cap-and-trade regime for carbon, it assumes that bureaucrats
will be able to diagnose and solve very large social problems through government
fiat. Conservatives have every reason to reject this assumption.
The aspect of hyper-incarceration most vulnerable to this charge is the war on
drugs. The drug war has incarcerated huge numbers of people at great expense in a
demonstrably failed effort to change individual behavior that imposes no obvious
harm on others.60 At one time, drug abuse was a signature issue for conservatives
worried about the moral unraveling of the country. Long prison sentences for drug
users and sellers were always in tension with libertarian strands of conservative
thought, however.6 ' The large-scale federal involvement also conflicts with
conservatism's bias toward localism. 62 Finally, the insistence on a government
obligation to prevent drug abuse is hard to reconcile with notions of personal
responsibility that are at the core of almost all conservative thought. As modern
conservatism moves away from culture war issues, these tensions become more
salient, and, so, the prospects of exploiting them expand.
It does not follow that drugs alone are either the sole source of or sole solution
to the hyper-incarceration problem. If everyone convicted of drug offenses were
released from every local, state, and federal prison tomorrow, the United States
would still have a hyper-incarceration problem. Moreover, although libertarian
conservatism is enjoying something of a renaissance, social conservatism is far
from dead, and these conservatives remain resistant to drug legalization.63
60 According to The Sentencing Project, there has been a 1100% increase in the number of
persons incarcerated on drug charges since 1980, from about 40,000 people to 500,000. The number
of people now incarcerated for drug offenses is greater than the number incarcerated for all offenses
in 1980. See MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE CHANGING RACIAL DYNAMICS OF THE
WAR ON DRUGS 1 (2009), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/dp-raceanddrugs.pdf. Despite
these efforts, as of 2009, an estimated 21.8 million Americans aged 12 or older, or 8.7% of the
population, were current drug users. See OFFICE OF APPLIED STUDIEs, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., RESULTS FROM THE 2009 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH: SUMMARY OF
NATIONAL FINDINGS 1 (2010), available at
http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/NSDUHI2k9NSDUH/2k9Results.htm.
61 For an example of libertarian criticism, see David Boaz & Timothy Lynch, The War on
Drugs, in CATO HANDBOOK FOR POLICYMAKERS 337 (7th ed. 2009).
62 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 57-58 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing
that local cultivation and consumption of marijuana is not commerce within the meaning of the
Commerce Clause of Article I).
63 See, e.g., Charles D. Stimson, Legalizing Marijuana: Why Citizens Should Just Say No,
LEGAL MEMORANDUM 56 (The Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C.), Sept. 13, 2010, available at
http://thf media.s3.amazonaws.com/2010/pdflImOO56.pdf; Lydia Saad, U.S. Support for Legalizing
Marjuana Reaches New High, GALLUP, Oct. 19, 2009, available at
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The potential for conservative opposition to hyper-incarceration extends
beyond drugs, and beyond libertarianism, however. For fiscal conservatives,
worried about massive government spending, high taxes, and huge deficits, the
cost of hyper-incarceration is, or at least should be, a source of major concern.
Each prisoner costs the government an average of $23,867 per year to maintain,64
and the prison system averages seven percent of state general fund spending.6 In
times of prosperity, perhaps we could indulge our taste for retribution. In these
leaner times, long sentences become a luxury that we cannot afford.
One has to ask, as well, precisely who benefits from these expenditures. That
question, in turn, suggests the possibility that the racism historically supporting
hyper-incarceration might be made to face in the opposite direction. Despite the
well-publicized cases of cross-racial violence, the fact is that the vast majority of
victims of African American crime are, themselves, African American. Most
African American drug dealers sell drugs to other African Americans, and
African Americans are the victims of the overwhelming majority of murders
committed by African Americans.
Viewed from this perspective, hyper-incarceration might be characterized as
yet another effort to tax middle class white people for the benefit of the black
underclass. It feeds into the deep suspicion of "Reagan Democrats" that
government generally is an instrument for the redistribution of wealth at the
expense of hard working "ordinary Americans" and for the benefit of the lazy and
ignorant.69
http://www.gallup.com/poll/123728/u.s.-support-legalizing-marijuana-reaches-new-high.aspx; John
P. Walters, Drug Legalization Isn't the Answer, WALL ST. J., March 6, 2009, at Al5, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123630239109047197.html. According to a Gallup Poll, seventy-
eight percent of self-described liberals favor decriminalization of marijuana use, but seventy-two
percent of conservatives oppose decriminalization.
6 See ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008, THE PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, 11 (2008),
available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/8015PCTS-Prison08_FINAL_2-1-
1_FORWEB.pdf.
65 See STATE ExPENDrrURE REPORT, NAT'L Ass'N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS 54 (2010),
available at http://www.nasbo.org/Publications/StateExpenditure Report/State Expenditure Report
Archives/tabid/107/default.aspx.
6 For some evidence that states are beginning to respond to the fiscal pressures, see Monica
Davey, Missouri Tells Judges Cost of Sentences, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2010, at Al (reporting that
state sentencing advisory commission has put in place a program to tell judges cost of individual
sentences they impose). See also infra notes 70-74.
67 See K. JACK RILEY, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE & OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY,
RESEARCH REPORT: CRACK, POWDER COCAINE, AND HEROIN: DRUG PURCHASE AND USE IN SIX U.S.
CITIES 1 (1997) ("Respondents were most likely to report using a main source who was of their own
racial or ethnic background, regardless of the drug considered.").
61 See JAMES ALAN Fox, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE U.S., ,
(2006), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/homicide/race.cfm (from 1976 to 2005, eighty-
six percent of white victims killed by whites and ninety-four percent of black victims killed by
blacks).
69 See, e.g., PAUL KRUGMAN, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL 178-83 (2007).
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It turns out, then, that lack of empathy for the target community might be an
engine for reform rather than for repression. Nor is this merely a hypothetical
possibility. It remains too early to know for sure, but it appears at least possible
that hyper-incarceration has begun to slowly recede. 70 Both the state and federal
governments have softened draconian drug laws, and incarceration of users has
declined dramatically.7 ' Many states have enacted reforms that attempt to control
the growth of prison populations. 72 Other states have responded to crippling fiscal
problems by actually releasing nonviolent offenders.
Perhaps the ameliorative and transformative efforts discussed above have
caused some of these changes. Some, no doubt, have nothing to do with micro-
processes, but are simply unavoidable reactions to overwhelming fiscal concerns.
It is also possible that incarceration rates are sensitive to crime rates, but lag well
behind them. Incarceration rates may finally be falling in a delayed reaction to the
very substantial reduction in the rate of crime.74 Still, it is always a mistake to
underestimate the effect of racism on American politics. If hyper-incarceration
70 The Pew Center on the States reports that for the first time in nearly forty years, the number
of state prisoners declined in 2009, although the decline was modest and was more than
counterbalanced by an increase in the number of federal prisoners. See THE PEW CENTER ON THE
STATES, PRISON COUNT 2010: STATE POPULATION DECLINES FOR THE FIRST TIME IN 38 YEARs 1 (2010)
available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/Prison Count_2010.pdf?n=880 [hereinafter
PRISON COUNT 2010]. See also HEATHER C. WEST, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS DATA BRIEF, PRISONERS
AT YEAREND 2009-ADVANCE COUNTS 1 (2010) (data showing declining rate of increase in prison population
since 2006).
71 See, e.g., NICOLE D. PORTER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE STATE OF SENTENCING 2009:
DEVELOPMENTS IN POLICY AND PRACTICE 1-2 (2010), available at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/s-ssr2009Update.pdf (reporting three states scaled
back scope of mandatory minimum drug sentences) [hereinafter THE STATE OF SENTENCING]; Erik
Eckholm, Congress Moves to Narrow Cocaine Sentencing Disparities, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2010, at
A16 (reporting House passage of bill that would reduce disparities between mandatory federal
sentences for crack and powdered cocaine); Jeremy W. Peters, Albany Reaches Deal to Repeal '70s
Drug Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2009, at Al (reporting on agreement to dismantle mandatory
minimum sentences for lower-level drug felons and widen reach of drug courts);. On the growth of
drug courts that provide diversion rather than incarceration for drug offenders, see supra notes 39-40.
72 See, e.g., THE STATE OF SENTENCING 2009, supra note 71 (reporting that seven states have
amended probation and parole polices to expand good time and earned time programs; two states
have created incentive programs for local jurisdictions to reduce probation revocations; and four
states created oversight committees or task forces to address sentencing laws, overcrowding, and
reentry services).
7 See, e.g., PRISON COUNT 2010, supra note 70 (reporting that Mississippi rolled back to
twenty-five percent from eighty-five percent the portion of sentences that nonviolent offenders are
required to serve prior to parole eligibility and that Michigan reduced its prison population by more
than 6000 by, among other things, reducing the number of inmates who serve more than 100% of
their minimum sentence); Jennifer Steinhauer, To Cut Costs, States Relax Prison Policies, N.Y.
TIMES, March 25, 2009, at Al, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/25/us/25prisons.html?pagewanted=all (reporting that "many [state]
governments, out of money and buried under mounting prison costs, are reversing ... policies [of
long prison sentences].").
74 See supra note 8.
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ever ends, its demise may be caused not by white people caring more about
African Americans trapped in poverty and crime, but by their continued insistence
on not caring at all.
The question, then, is whether these inchoate trends might be encouraged and
reform hastened by taking advantage of conservative and racist impulses. The
approach has some attraction, if only because it sidesteps the daunting obstacles to
fundamental change. For example, white support for hyper-incarceration may rest
more on mistaken factual assumptions than on deep ideological commitments.
Whites regularly overestimate the risks that they face from criminal violence. 5 If
they could be convinced that these risks are mostly borne by African Americans,7 6
their attitudes toward hyper-incarceration might change. Correcting this factual
mistake is almost certainly easier than establishing affective connections between
majority and minority communities.
Still, the downsides of this strategy are obvious. First, the approach takes
conservative commitments to libertarianism and localism at face value. There is a
long and sad history of abandonment of these commitments when they come into
conflict with less defensible conservative goals of protecting reserves of power and
privilege. Who is to say that they will not be abandoned again if they are seen to
advance progressive causes?
An attack on hyper-incarceration grounded in racial resentment does not pose
this difficulty, but it has problems of its own. Should progressives traffic in this
currency, even if it has short-term salutary effects? Even if they should, the effort
to harness racism will be effective only if opponents of racial justice can somehow
be tricked into acting in ways that are not in their self-interest. A politics of
accommodation therefore requires a deviousness that may be too clever by half.
Opponents of hyper-incarceration must somehow maintain the discipline and
disingenuousness to convincingly misrepresent their own objectives.
Finally, there is the question of who, precisely, is the one being tricked. It is,
after all, true that poor African American communities bear the brunt of criminal
violence.n It is a fact, and not just a racist fantasy, that young black men regularly
slaughter other black men in the streets of our inner cities, that poor families in
minority communities live in daily fear of rapes and armed robberies, and that the
7s See Lincoln Quillian & Devah Prager, Estimating Risk: Stereotype Amplification and the
Perceived Risk of Criminal Victimization, 73 SoC. PSYCH. Q. 79 (2010).
76 According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, with the exception of simple assault, blacks
experience a higher rate of criminal violence than whites for every crime that the Bureau measures.
See MICHAEL R. RAND, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION 4 (2009).
According to a poll conducted by Money Magazine, sixty-nine percent of Americans believe that
white victims of crime are more or equally likely to be attacked by members of other races, when, in
fact, they are most often victimized by members of their own race. Walter L. Updegrave, As Grim
Crime Scenes Fill Our Newscasts and Nightmares, Americans Feel More Threatened by Violence
than Ever, MONEY, July 1, 1994, available at
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/moneymag/moneymag-archive/1994/06/01/8891 1/index.htm.
77 See RAND, supra note 76; see also Updegrave, supra note 76.
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lives of many African Americans are destroyed by drug addiction. If there is
indeed a racist argument against hyper-incarceration, does it follow that there is an
argument grounded in racial justice for it?
Of course, virtually all progressives will deny that it does follow, and I am
inclined to agree with them. Progressives will rightly claim that hyper-
incarceration makes the problem worse rather than better. What is needed to
protect the African American community from criminal predation, they will say, is
not a brutal criminal justice system, but employment, economic justice, decent
schools, and an end to racial isolation. But now we have come full circle. A focus
on these solutions directs our attention, once again, to the seemingly intractable
problems of the black underclass and to the forces that cause these problems. It
was precisely the impulse to escape this focus that motivated the attention to
micro-processes in the first place.
V. WHERE THIS LEAVES US
Unsurprisingly, then, there is not a politics that simply and cleanly solves the
hyper-incarceration problem. What we are left with is an unhappy choice between
strategies, each of which has important defects and poses significant dangers. So
what is to be done? I am not at all sure, but in this final section, I want to suggest
the possibility that our choice should be dictated more by temperament than by
pragmatics.
None of the available options are likely to work very well, if at all. The
incarceration of millions of our fellow inhabitants is almost certainly symptomatic
of a more systemic, possibly terminal, illness in American-style constitutional
democracy. In particular, it is tied to the decline of good jobs, economic mobility,
and community cohesion. Those declines, in tum, are both symptoms and causes
of America's global decline.
No empire lasts forever, and there is plenty of reason to believe that the
American empire is in its last days. The question, then, is not whether the patient
will recover, but what kind of treatment will produce death with dignity.
There are three temperamental responses to this tragic choice. At the risk of
metaphor overload (and, perhaps, of using yet again a tired and inapt comparison),
one might liken the trilemma to various attitudes toward the Holocaust adopted by
people of good will as their world collapsed in Nazi-occupied Europe. Although
the disanalogies are obvious, there is nonetheless a core similarity in the basic,
tragic structure of the available choices.
One response to the Holocaust was to do the little one could to protect
individuals from Nazi atrocities. No one supposed that these individual acts of
courage and decency would end the slaughter. Still, something is better than
nothing, and, as the experience in Denmark demonstrates, sometimes little things
13 1
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add up to bigger things. People attracted to this response will want to engage in
the politics of amelioration.
Others believed that these ameliorative efforts trivialized the enormity of the
disaster. The only decent response to an evil of this magnitude, they believed, was
to stand and fight, even in the full knowledge that the struggle was futile. The
brave, doomed rebellion in the Warsaw ghetto illustrates this response. People
who are attracted to it will want to engage in the politics of transformation.
Finally, some believed that heroic as it was, this sort of rebellion was also
self-indulgent. Nothing could be gained by pointless martyrdom, but at least
something might be achieved by Faustian bargains that dealt with the Nazis on
their own terms. Those who followed this course negotiated with Nazis over
Jewish lives80 or joined the Judenrat, which collaborated with the Nazis in the hope
of softening their policies at the margin. People attracted to this response will
want to engage in the politics of accommodation.
I am afraid that I have very little to say about the choice between these
alternatives. First, this is not the sort of dispute that is likely to be settled by some
sort of winning logical argument or even by a clear-eyed analysis of the
consequences of various courses of action. It is a dispute about what kind of
people we imagine ourselves to be, not about how to achieve our ends. Second,
when I try to imagine myself confronted with this choice in Nazi-occupied Europe,
I can easily see myself following each of the three courses of action. I do not
suppose that I would be exactly at peace with any of these choices, but neither
need any of the choices be a source of deep regret and self-condemnation.
My worry about myself is not that I would make a wrong choice between
these alternatives, but that I would avoid the necessity of choice by adopting a
stance of world-weary passivity or complacent indifference. There is no good way
to deal with overwhelming evil, but there is surely a way not to deal with it.
Willful blindness, craven apologetics, and flaccid acquiescence are not options
when millions of our fellow inhabitants are behind bars. Like the people of good
will trapped in Nazi Europe, we opponents of hyper-incarceration need to confront
the truth of our situation and be honest about how bleak the prospects are. But
pessimism should not be confused with passivity. Even if our efforts accomplish
nothing at all, and whatever form our politics take, we must do what we can to stop
the horror.
Our personal dignity demands no less.
78 Because of the conduct of the Danish people and government, more than ninety-eight percent of the
Jewish population was saved. See MOSHE BEJSKI, THE INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL FOR HOLOCAUST STUDIES,
THE "RIGHTEOUs AMONG THE NATIONS" AND THEIR PART IN THE RESCUE OF JEWS 6, available at
http://wwwl.yadvashenorg/yv/en/righteousfpdf/resources/righteousrescue.pdf (last visited Oct 13, 2011).
7 For an account, see ISRAEL GuTMAN, RESISTANCE: THE WARSAW GHETro UPRISING (1994).
80 See, e.g., YEHuDA BAUER, JEWS FOR SALE? NAZI-JEWISH NEGOTIATIONS, 1933-1945 (1994).
8I For a sympathetic account of the Judenrat, see ISAIAH TRUNK, JUDENRAT: THE JEWISH
COUNCILs IN EASTERN EUROPE UNDER NAZI OCCUPATION (1972).
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